Use case · Secure Design
Continuous threat modeling with enforcement context.
Threat modeling runs continuously across design artifacts so material risks are identified before release pressure builds. Every threat is tracked with ownership, severity, and remediation context.
The pipeline
A repeatable threat-modeling workflow.
System decomposition maps trust boundaries, then modeling surfaces high-signal threats with remediation requirements tied to approved intent.
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Starting
Initialize pipeline, validate inputs
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Ingestion
Fetch Confluence, Jira, GitHub & docs
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Decomposition
Map components, flows & trust boundaries
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Threat Analysis
Identify potential threats in the design
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Critic
Second pass; remove dupes & false positives
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Requirements
Generate remediation requirements
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Report
Summarize, score & validate output
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Complete
Store model, findings & requirements
STRIDE findings
Threats with clear impact framing.
Each threat is classified, impact-scored, and paired with architectural remediation that can be tracked through delivery.
CRITICAL · F-01JWT signing-key compromise allows full tenant impersonation
The backend trusts the orgId claim inside a verified JWT as the sole source of tenant identity. If the signing key leaks, via a Secret Manager misconfig, a leaked artifact or an insider, an attacker can mint tokens for any organisation and any role.
REC-F01-R01 · STRIDE: Spoofing
Introduce short-lived asymmetric JWTs with a server-side session binding to limit blast radius of key compromise.
Introduce short-lived asymmetric JWTs with a server-side session binding to limit blast radius of key compromise.
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Kubeconfig endpoint lacks per-tenant ownership check
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Workspace lookups may not filter by organisation
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Platform API tokens not bound to a caller or session
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Isolation audit table has no tamper protection
Prioritized threat portfolio in progress
The Threat Register
One register for threat decisions.
Threats from design review and modeling land in one shared register so teams can prioritize by severity, status, and business context.
5×
Earlier remediation efficiency
8
Agent pipeline stages
24
Prioritized threats from modeling
6
Threats needing manual review